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Abstract
In this paper we propose to use the mathematical formalism of
Quantum Mechanics to capture the idea that agents’ preferences, in
addition to being typically uncertain, can also be indeterminate. They
are determined (i.e., realized, and not merely revealed) only when
the action takes place. An agent is described by a state that is a
superposition of potential types (or preferences or behaviors). This
superposed state is projected (or “collapses”) onto one of the possible
behaviors at the time of the interaction. In addition to the main
goal of modelling uncertainty of preferences that is not due to lack of
information, this formalism seems to be adequate to describe widely
observed phenomena of noncommutativity in patterns of behavior.
Two applications of the model are proposed. The first addresses the
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, and the second, framing effects.
Experimental tests of the theory are suggested.
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It has recently been proposed that models of quantum games can be used to
study how the extension of classical moves to quantum ones (i.e., complex
linear combinations of classical moves) can affect the analysis of a game. For
example Eisert et al. (1999) show that allowing the players to use quantum
strategies in the Prisoners’ Dilemma is a way of escaping the well-known ‘bad
feature’ of this game.1 From a game-theoretical point of view the approach
consists in changing the strategy spaces, and thus the interest of the results
lies in the appeal of these changes.2
This paper also proposes to use the mathematical formalism of Quantum
Mechanics but with a different intention: to model uncertain preferences.
The basic idea is that the Hilbert space model of Quantum Mechanics can
be thought of as a very general contextual predictive tool particularly well
suited to describing experiments in psychology or in “revealing” preferences.
The well-established Bayesian approach suggested by Harsanyi to model
incomplete information consists of a chance move that selects the types of
the players and informs each player of his own type. For the purposes of
this paper, we underline the following essential implication of this approach:
all uncertainty about a player’s type exclusively reflects the others player’s
incomplete knowledge of it. This follows from the fact that a Harsanyi type
is fully determined. It is a complete well-defined characteristic of a player
that is known to him. Consequently, from the point of view of the other
players, uncertainty as to the type can only be due to lack of information.
Each player has a probability distribution over the type of the other players,
but his own type is fully determined and is known to him.
This brings us to the first important point at which we depart from the
classical approach: we propose that in addition to informational reasons, the
uncertainty as to preferences is due to indeterminacy : prior to the moment
a player acts, his (behavior) type is indeterminate. The state representing
the player, is a superposition of potential types. It is only at the moment
1In the classical version of the dilemma, the dominant strategy for both players is to
defect and thereby to do worse than if they had both decided to cooperate. In the quantum
version, there are a couple of quantum strategies that are both a Nash equilibrium and
Pareto optimal and whose payoff is one of joint cooperation.
2This approach is closely related to quantum computing. It relies on the use of a
sophisticated apparatus to exploit q-bits’ property of entanglement in mixed strategies.
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when the player selects an action that a specific type is actualized.3 It is not
merely revealed but rather determined in the sense that prior to the choice,
there is an irreducible multiplicity of potential types. Thus we suggest that
in modelling a decision situation, we do not assume that the preference char-
acteristics can always be fully known with certainty (neither to the decision-
maker nor even to the analyst). Instead, what can be known is the state of
the agent: a vector in a Hilbert space which encapsulates all existing infor-
mation to predict how the agent is expected to behave in different decision
situations.
This idea, daringly imported from Quantum Mechanics to the context
of decision and game theory, is very much in line with Tversky and Simon-
son (Kahneman and Tversky 2000) according to whom “There is a growing
body of evidence that supports an alternative conception according to which
preferences are often constructed – not merely revealed – in the elicitation
process. These constructions are contingent on the framing of the problem,
the method of elicitation, and the context of the choice”. This view is also
consistent with that of cognitive psychology, which teaches one to distinguish
between objective reality and the proximal stimulus to which the observer is
exposed, and to further distinguish between those and the mental representa-
tion of the situation that the observer eventually constructs. More generally,
this view fits in with the observation that players (even highly rational ones)
may act differently in game theoretically equivalent situations that differ only
in seemingly irrelevant aspects (framing, prior unrelated events, etc.). Our
theory as to why agents act differently in game theoretically equivalent situa-
tions is that they are not in the same state; i.e., they are not the same agents:
(revealed) preferences are contextual because of (intrinsic) indeterminacy.
The basic analogy with Physics, which makes it appealing to adopt the
mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics to the social sciences, is the
following: we view an observed play, decisions, and choices as something
similar to the result of a measurement (of the player’s type). A decision sit-
uation is then similar to an experimental setup to measure the player’s type.
It is modeled as an operator (called observable), and the resulting behavior
as an eigenvalue of that operator. The analogy to the non-commutativity of
observables (a very central feature of Quantum Mechanics) is, in many em-
pirical phenomena, like the following well-known experiment conducted by
3The associated concept of irreducible uncertainty which is the essence of indetermi-
nacy, is formally defined in Section 2 of the paper.
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Leon Festinger (the father of the theory of cognitive dissonance see, e.g., Fes-
tinger 1957). In that experiment people were asked to perform a very boring
task. They would sort a batch of spools into lots of twelve and turn a square
pegs a quarter turn to the left. They were then told that one subject was
missing and asked to convince a potential female subject in the waiting room
to participate. In one group they were offered $1, and in the other group $20,
for expressing enthusiasm for the task. Some refused, but others accepted.
Those who accepted for $20, later admitted that they thought the task was
dull. Those who accepted for $1 maintained that the task was enjoyable.
The experiment aimed at showing that attitudes change as a response to
cognitive dissonance. The dissonance faced by those who were paid $1 was
between the cognition of being a ‘good guy’ and of being ready to lie for a
dollar. Changing one’s attitude to the task resolves the dissonance.4 Similar
phenomena have been documented in hazardous industries, with employees
showing very little caution in the face of danger. Here too, experimental and
empirical studies (e.g., Daniel Ben–Horing 1979) exhibited attitude changes
among employees following their decision to work in a hazardous industry.
More generally, suppose that an agent is subject to the same decision situ-
ation in two different contexts (the contexts may vary with respect to the
decision situations that precede the investigated one, or with respect to the
framing in the presentation of the decision, (cf. Selten 1998)). If we do not
observe the same decision in the two contexts, then the classical approach
is to say that the two decision situations are not the same; they should be
modeled so as to incorporate the context. In many cases, however, such an
assumption, i.e., that the situations are different, is difficult to justify. And
so, the standard theory leaves a host of behavioral phenomena unexplained:
the behavioral anomalies (cf. McFadden 1999).
In contrast, we propose that the observed decisions are not taken by an
agent in the same state. The context, e.g., a past decision situation, is viewed
as an operator that does not commute with the operator associated with the
investigated decision situation; its operation on the agent has changed his
state. As in Quantum Mechanics, the phenomenon of non-commutativity
of decision situations (measurements) leads us to conjecture that an agent’s
preferences are represented by a state that is indeterminate and gets deter-
mined (with respect to any particular type characteristics) in the course of
4Those offered $20 did not face such a tension because $20 (in the fifties) was viewed
as a sufficient motivation for a little lie.
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interaction with the environment. Our approach allows us to go beyond the
cognitive dissonance (CD) argument. According to the CD theory cognitive
coherence is a basic human need (like food). Accordingly, CD has a ‘drive-
like’ property (like hunger) that induces non-commutativity in behaviors and
attitudes. However, the theory cannot explain why dissonance arises in the
first place. As an illustration of the general approach we will show in Sec-
tion 3 that a Hilbert space model of preferences can provide an appropriate
framework in which to present and study CD–like phenomena.
The objective of this paper is to propose a theoretical framework that
extends the Bayes–Harsanyi model to accommodate various forms of the
so-called behavioral anomalies. We attempt to provide a model for the
KT(Kahneman–Tversky)–man as opposed to what McFadden calls the ‘Chicago
man’ (McFadden 1999). Our work is related to Random Utility Models
(RUM) as well as to Behavioral economics. RUM models have proven very
useful tools for explaining and predicting deviations from standard utility
models. However, the RUM cannot accommodate the kind of drastic and
systematic deviations characteristic of the KT–man. These models are based
on an hypothesis of ‘the primacy of desirability over availability’ and they
assume stable taste templates. In RUM, preferences are non-contextual by
construction, while in the proposed Hilbert Space Model (HSM), (actualized)
preferences are contextual. Behavioral economics has contributed a wide vari-
ety of theories (see Camerer 1997). Often the proposed explanations address
a very specific deviation (e.g., ‘trade off contrast’ or ‘extremeness aversion’
(Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Important insights have been obtained by
systematically investigating the consequences on utility maximization of ‘fair-
ness concerns’ (Rabin 1993), ‘cost of self-control’ (Gul and Pesendorfer 2001)
or ‘concerns for self-image’ (Benabou and Tirole 2002). Yet, other explana-
tions appeal to bounded rationality, e.g., ‘superficial reasoning’ or ‘choice of
beliefs’ (Selten 1998, Akerlof and Dickens 1982). In contrast, the HSM is
a framework model that addresses structural properties of preferences, i.e.,
their intrinsic indeterminacy.
In section 2, we present the framework and some basic notions of quantum
theory. In Section 3, we develop applications of the theory to social sciences.
Two experiments to test the theory are suggested. Concluding remarks are
gathered in the last section. The appendix provides a brief exposition of
some basic concepts of quantum mechanics.
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2 The basic framework
In this section we present the basic notions of our framework. They are
heavily inspired by the mathematical formalism of Quantum Mechanics ( see
e.g., Cohen-Tannundji, Dui, Laloe¨ 1973 and Cohen 1989) from which we also
borrow the notation.
2.1 The notions of state and superposition
The object of our investigation is individual choice behavior, which we in-
terpret as the revelation of an agent’s preferences in what we call a Decision
Situation (DS). In this paper we focus on non-repeated non-strategic deci-
sion situations. Examples of such DSs include the choice between buying a
Toshiba or a Compaq laptop, the choice between investing in a project or
not, the choice between a sure gain of $100 or a bet with probability 0.5 to
win $250 and 0.5 to win $0, etc. When considering games, we view them as
decision situations from the perspective of a single player.5
An agent is represented by a state which captures the agent’s expected
behavior in the decision situation under consideration. Mathematically, a
state |ψ〉 is a vector in a Hilbert space H of finite or countably infinite
dimensions, over the field of the real numbers R.6 The relationship between
H and a decision situation will be specified later. For technical reasons
related to the probabilistic content of the state, the vector that represents it
has to be of length one, that is, 〈ψ |ψ〉2 = 1 (where 〈· |·〉 denotes the inner
product in H). So all vectors of the form λ |ψ〉 where λ ∈ R, correspond to
the same state, which we represent by a vector of length one.
A key ingredient in the formalism of indeterminacy is the principle of
superposition. This principle states that the linear combination of any two
states is itself a possible state.7 Consider two states |ϕ1〉 , |ϕ2〉 ∈ H, then
5All information (beliefs) and strategic considerations are embedded in the definition
of the choices. Thus the agent’s play of C is a play of C given, e.g., his information
(knowledge) about the opponent.
6In Quantum Mechanics the number field is that of complex numbers. However, for
our purposes the field of real numbers provides the structure and the properties needed
(see e.g. Beltrametti and Cassinelli 1981 and Holland 1995). Everything we present in
the appendix (Elements of quantum mechanics) remains true when we replace Hermitian
operators with real symmetric operators.
7We use the term state to refer to ‘pure state’. Some people use the term state to refer
to mixture of pure states. A mixture of pure states combines indeterminacy with elements
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|ψ〉 ∈ H where |ψ〉 = λ1 |ϕ1〉 + λ2 |ϕ2〉 for any λ1, λ2 ∈ R, with λ21 + λ22 = 1.
The principle of superposition implies that, unlike the Harsanyi type space,
the state space is non-Boolean.8
2.2 The notions of observable and of measurement
A decision situation is defined by the set of alternative choices available to
the agent. When an agent selects an action out of a set corresponding to a
decision situation, we say that he ‘plays’ the DS. To every Decision Situation
A, we associate an observable, namely, a specific symmetric operator on
H which, for notational simplicity, we also denote by A. If A is the only
decision situation we consider, we can assume that its eigenvectors, which we
denote by |1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉, all correspond to different eigenvalues, denoted
by 1A, 2A, ..., nA respectively.
A |kA〉 = kA |kA〉 , k = 1, ..., n.
As A is symmetric, there is a unique orthonormal basis of the relevant
Hilbert space H formed with its eigenvectors. The basis {|1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉}
is the unique orthonormal basis of H consisting of eigenvectors of A. It is





λk |kA〉 , (1)




The expansion (1) can also be written as
H = H1A⊕, ...,⊕HnA , HiA ⊥ HjA, i 6= j, (2)
of incomplete information. They are represented by so called density operators.
8The distributivity condition defining a Boolean space is dropped for a weaker condition
called ortho-modularity. The basic structure of the state space is that of a logic, i.e., an
orthomodular lattice. For a good presentation of Quantum Logic, a concept introduced
by Birkhoff and Von Neuman (1936), and further developed by Mackey (2004, 1963), see
Cohen (1989).
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where ⊕ denotes the direct sum of the subspaces H1A , ...,HnA spanned by
|1A〉, ..., |nA〉 respectively.9 Or, equivalently, we can write IH = P1A+, ...,+PnA
where PiA is the projection operator on HiA and IH is the identity operator
on H.
A decision situation A can be thought of as an experimental setup where
the agent is invited to choose a particular action among all possible actions
in that decision situation. The actual implementation of the experiment is
represented by a measurement of the associated observable A. According
to the so-called Reduction Principle (see Appendix), the result of such a
measurement can only be one of the n eigenvalues of A. If the result is mA,
i.e., the player selects action mA, the superposition
∑
λi |iA〉 “collapses”
onto the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue mA. The initial state
|ψ〉 is projected into the subspace HmA(of eigenvectors of A with eigenvalue
mA). The probability that the measurement yields the result mA is equal
to 〈mA |ψ〉2 = λ2m,10 i.e., the square of the corresponding coefficient in the
superposition. The coefficients themselves, called ‘amplitudes of probability’
play a key role in studying sequences of measurements (see Section 2.3). As
usual, we will interpret the probability of mA either as the probability that
one agent in state |ψ〉 selects action mA or as the proportion of the agents
who will make the choice mA in a population of many agents, all in the state
|ψ〉.
In our theory an agent is represented by a state. We shall also use the term
type to denote a state degenerated to one eigenvector, say |mA〉 . An agent in
this state is said to be of type mA. An agent in a general state |ψ〉 is hence a
superposition of all types relevant to the DS under consideration. Our notion
of type is closely related to the notion used by Harsanyi. A type captures all
the agent’s characteristics (taste, subjective beliefs) of relevance for uniquely
predicting the agent’s choice in a given situation. In contrast to Harsanyi
we shall not assume that there exists an exhaustive description of the agent
that enables us to uniquely determine the agent’s choice in all possible de-
cision situations simultaneously. Instead, our types are characterized by an
irreducible uncertainty that is revealed when the agent is confronted with a
9That is, for i 6= j any vector in HiA is orthogonal to any vector in HjA and any vector
in H is a sum of n vectors, one in each component space.
10For simplicity we assume that all eigenvalues are ‘non-degenerated’. We return to this
issue below.
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sequence of choices (see Section 2.3.2 below for a formal characterization of
irreducible uncertainty).
Remark: Clearly, when only one DS is considered, the above description
is equivalent to the traditional probabilistic representation of an agent by a
probability vector (α1,....,αn) in which αk is the probability that the agent will
choose action kA and αk = λ
2
k for k = 1, ..., n. The advantage of the proposed
formalism consists in enabling us to study several decision situations and the
interaction between them.
2.3 More than one Decision Situation
When studying more than one DS, say A and B, it turns out that a key
question is whether the corresponding observables are commuting operators
inH, i.e., whether AB = BA. The question of whether two DSs can be repre-
sented by two commuting operators is an empirical one. Before commenting
on this feature we will first study its mathematical implications.
2.3.1 Commuting Decision Situations
Let A and B be two DSs. If the corresponding observables commute then
there is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space H formed by
eigenvectors common to both A and B. Denote by |i〉 (for i = 1, ..., n) these
basis vectors. We have
A |i〉 = iA |i〉 and B |i〉 = iB |i〉 .
In general, the eigenvalues can be degenerated (i.e., for some i and j, iA = jA
















If we measure B first, we observe eigenvalue jB with probability pB (jB) =∑
k;kB=jB
λ2k. After B is measured and the result jB obtained, the state |ψ〉
is projected into the eigensubspace EjB spanned by the eigenvectors of B









is necessary to make
∣∣ψjB〉 a unit vector).
When we measure A on the agent in the state
∣∣ψjB〉 , we obtain iA with
probability







So when we measure first B and then A, the probability of observing the
eigenvalue iA is pAB (iA) =
∑

























Hence, pAB (iA) = pA (iA) , ∀i, and similarly pBA (jB) = pB (jB) , ∀j.
When dealing with commuting observables it is meaningful to speak of
measuring them simultaneously. Whether we measure first A and then B
or first B and then A, the probability distribution on the joint outcome is




λ2k, so (iA , jB) is a well-defined event. Formally,
this implies that the two DSs can be merged into a single DS with a vector-
valued measurement outcome, i.e., a value in A and a value in B. To each
eigenvalue of the merged observable we associate a type that captures all the
characteristics of the agent relevant to his choices (one in each DS).
Remark: Note that again, as in the case of a single DS, for two such
DSs our model is equivalent to a standard (discrete) probability space in





In particular, in accordance with the calculus of probability we see that the
conditional probability formula holds:
pAB(iA ∧ jB) = pA(iA) pB(jB|iA).
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For example, consider the following two decision problems. Let A be
the decision situation of choosing between a week vacation in Tunisia and a
week vacation in Italy. And let B be the choice between buying 1000 euros
of shares in Bouygues Telecom or in Deutsche Telecom. It is quite plausible
that A and B commute, but whether or not this is in fact the case is of course
an empirical question. If A and B commute we expect a decision on portfolio
(B) not to affect decision-making regarding the location for vacation (A).
And thus the order in which the decisions are made does not matter.
Note that the commutativity of the observables does not exclude statis-
tical correlations between observations. To see this, consider the following
example in which A and B each have two degenerated eigenvalues in a four
dimensional Hilbert space. Denote by |iAjB〉 (i = 1, 2, j = 1, 2) the eigen-




























(for i = 1 or i = 2).
So if we first measure B and find, say, 1B, it is much more likely (with
probability 3
4
) that when measuring A we will find 1A rather than 2A (with
probability 1
4
). In other words, the statistical correlation is informational:
information about one of the observables is relevant to the prediction of the
value of the other. But the two interactions (measurements) do not affect
each other, i.e., the distribution of the outcomes of the measurement of A is
the same whether or not we measure B first.
2.3.2 Non-commuting Decision Situations
It is when we consider decision situations associated with observables that
do not commute that the predictions of the HSM differ from those of the
probabilistic model. In such a context, the quantum probability calculus
(p (〈iA |ψ〉) = 〈iA |ψ〉2) generates cross-terms also called interference term.
These cross-terms are the signature of indeterminacy. In the next section
we demonstrate how this feature of the HSM captures the phenomenon of
cognitive dissonance as well as that of framing.
For simplicity, assume that the two decision situations A and B have
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the same number n of possible choices, which means that the observables A
and B have (non-degenerated) eigenvalues 1A, 2A, ..., nA and 1B, 2B, ..., nB
respectively and each one of the sets of eigenvectors {|1A〉, |2A〉, ..., |nA〉} and
{|1B〉, |2B〉, ..., |nB〉} is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space.








We note that since each set of eigenvectors of the respective observables
forms a basis of the state space there exists a unitary operator S such that







S is a basis transformation n × n matrix with elements 〈jB |iA〉 . In the
next section we show that this matrix plays an important role in practical
applications of the theory.11 For the ease of presentation we write µij =



















If he first plays B, he selects action jB with probability ν
2
j and his state is
projected onto |jB〉. The agent then selects action iA in decision situation A






11Conversely, we have that S−1 transforms the basis formed by the eigenvectors of the
B observable into the basis formed by the eigenvectors of A.
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. Playing B first changes the






















= pAB(iA) + interference term
The interference term is the sum of cross-terms involving the amplitudes of
probability (the Appendix provides a description of interference effects in
Physics).
Some intuition about interference effects may be provided using the con-
cept of ‘propensity’ due to Popper (1992). Imagine an agent’s mind as a
system of propensities to act (corresponding to different possible actions).
As long as the agent is not required to choose an action in a given DS, the
corresponding propensities coexist in his mind; the agent has not “made up
his mind”. A decision situation operates on this state of ‘hesitation’ to trig-
ger the emergence of a single type (of behavior). But as long as alternative
propensities are present in the agent’s mind, they affect choice behavior by
increasing or decreasing the probability of the choices under investigation.
An illustration of this kind of situation may be supplied by the experiment
reported in Knetz and Camerer (2000). The two DSs studied are the Weak
Link (WL) game and the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game.12 They compare
the distribution of choices in the Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) game when it
is preceded by a Weak Link (WL) game and when only the PD game is
being played. Their results show that playing the WL game affects the play
of individuals in the PD game. The authors appeal to an informational
argument, which they call the “precedent effect”.13 However, they cannot
explain the high rate of cooperation (37.5 %) in the last round of the PD
12The Weak Link game is a type of coordination game where each player picks an action
from a set of integers. The payoffs are defined in such a manner that each player wants to
select the minimum of the other players but everyone wants that minimum to be as high
as possible.
13The precedent effect hypothesis is as follows: “The shared experience of playing the
efficient equilibrium in the WL game creates a precedent of efficient play strong enough to
13
game (Table 5, p. 206). Instead, we propose that the WL and the PD are
two DS that do not commute. In such a case we expect a difference in the
distributions of choices in the (last round of the) PD depending on whether
or not it was preceded by a play of the WL or another PD game.
Remark: In this case, A and B cannot have simultaneously defined val-
ues: the state of the agent is characterized by irreducible uncertainty. Equiv-
alently, and in contrast with the commuting case, two non-commuting ob-
servables cannot be merged into one observable. There is no probability
distribution on the event ‘to have the value iA for A and the value jB for B.’




















As G. W. Mackey expresses it “When A and B do not commute there
are limitations to the degree to which the probability distribution of the cor-
responding observables may be simultaneously concentrated near to single
points” (Mackey 2000, p. 78). In our context these limitations can be inter-
preted as reflecting the psychological coherence structure. When the agent
knows what he prefers in one situation, he is ‘doomed’ to be hesitating in
some other (non-commuting) decision situation.
3 HSM in the Social Sciences
In this section we apply the general framework to explain two instances of
behavioral anomalies that have been extensively studied in the literature but
under very different approaches.
3.1 The Act of Choice
A central feature of the HSM approach is that choices alter the state of the
agent, which may imply non-commutativity of choice behavior. Of course,
(...) lead to cooperation in a finitely repeated PD game”, Knetz and Camerer (2000 see
p.206).
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not all instances of non-commutativity in decision theory call for Hilbert
space modelling. An agent’s preferences between a long opera or a ‘stay at
home evening’ are not expected to be the same before an afternoon party
where she is invited to choose between whisky or champagne and after she
has been drinking a few glasses. Theories of addiction also feature effects of
past choices on future preferences. And in standard consumer theory, choices
do have implications for future behavior, i.e., when goods are substitutes or
complements. The above examples hardly qualify as behavioral anomalies,
however. In the above mentioned cases we do expect future preferences to be
affected by the choices. The Hilbert space model of preferences is useful when
we expect choice behavior to be consistent with the standard probabilistic
model, because nothing justifies a modification of preferences. Yet, actual
behavior contradicts those expectations.
In the article “Maximization and the Act of Choice” (1997) Nobel lau-
reate Amartya Sen argues for the need to account for the ‘act of choice’
as distinguished from the ‘result of choice’ in social and economic analysis.
The phenomenon known as ‘cognitive dissonance’ which refers to a change
in ‘attitude’ following a decision, is the most straightforward expression of
the effect of the act of choice on future behavior. We propose below a HSM
presentation of cognitive dissonance that features a dynamic effect of the act
of choice in line with psychologists’ ‘forces of cognitive coherence’.
3.1.1 Dynamic decision-making
In this section we consider a dynamic decision problem involving a sequence
of two decisions, each with two options: A : {a1, a2} and B : {b1, b2} . We
shall assume that the agent is forward-looking, i.e., he takes into account the
effect of his current decision on his future preferences and decisions. This
approach facilitates the comparison with Akerlof and Dickens (1982) who
propose a cognitive dissonance model in which highly sophisticated agents
choose beliefs to fit their preferences.14
The sequence of decisions is first A then B. As usual, we analyze the
dynamic decision problem by backward induction. Any measurement of B
14Akerlof and Dickens (1981) allow workers to freely choose beliefs (about risk) so as
to optimize utility which includes psychological comfort. They are fully aware of the
way their subjective perception of the world is biased and yet they keep to the wrong
views. They are nevertheless highly rational in the sense that when selecting beliefs, they
internalize their effect their own subsequent bounded rational behavior.
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can give only one of two eigenvalues of the corresponding operator: either
b1 or b2. This leads us to define the two types as follows. When the agent
chooses b1 and the state collapses onto |b1〉 we say that the agent is of the
b1−type defined by b1 ≻ b2, i.e., he prefers b1 to b2; and similarly with the
b2−type: b2 ≻ b1.
We now consider the first decision situation. We have assumed that the
agent knows that decision situation A is followed by B and that the two
DSs are linked (non-commuting). We also assume that the agent knows the
correlation pattern, i.e., the S matrix (see Section 2.3.2). The elements of
the S matrix are the square roots of the statistical correlations between the
types associated with the choices in the respective DSs.15 We shall denote the
choices in A (when followed by B) as follows: a1 (B) , a2 (B) . The correlation
matrix is
S =
( 〈b1| a1 (B)〉 〈b2| a1 (B)〉
〈b1| a2 (B)〉 〈b2| a2 (B)〉
)
.
As in the general setting, we write the eigenvectors of A in terms of the eigen-
vectors of B (recall that in the quantum formalism |ψ〉 and 2 |ψ〉 represent
the same state):
|a1 (B)〉 = 〈b1| a1 (B)〉 |b1〉+ 〈b2| a1 (B)〉 |b2〉 (4)
|a2 (B)〉 = 〈b1| a2 (B)〉 |b1〉+ 〈b2| a2 (B)〉 |b2〉 . (5)
By assumption the agent is forward-looking, so the choice of a1 actual-
izes preferences with the following interpretation: a1 and the ‘lottery’ in
B associated with a1( implied by (4)), is preferred to a2 and its associated
lottery (implied by (5)).16 At the beginning of the choice sequence the agent
15This is clearly seen in eq. (4) below. The probability that type a1 (B) will choose b1
is given by the square of the coefficient of superposition, i.e., 〈b1| a1 (B)〉2 .
16The a1 (B)−type can be described in terms of preferences over ‘bundles’ where the
second term is the associated lottery:
(a1, (αb1 + (1− α) b2)) ≻ (a2, (βb1 + (1 − β)b2))
where α = 〈b1| a1 (B)〉2 and β = 〈b1| a2 (B)〉2 . We use the term ‘lottery’ to capture the
agent’s indeterminacy in B. This is consistent with our results in Section 2.2, which show
the equivalence of the HSM with the probabilistic model in the single DS case. At the
time when the agent faces B, B is the only relevant DS.
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is in a state of superposition:
|ψ〉 = λ1 |a1 (B)〉+ λ2 |a2 (B)〉 , λ21 + λ22 = 1.
3.1.2 Cognitive dissonance
We now show how the above model captures cognitive dissonance (CD). The
typical ‘story’ is that workers who choose employment in risky jobs behave
as if they undervalued risk compared with workers who are not confronted
with such a choice.
We define the options as follows. Let A be a decision about jobs; a1 :
take a job with a hazardous task (adventurous type), a2 : stay in a safe
task (habit-prone type). Let B be a decision about behavior at the risky
workplace; the choices are b1: use safety equipment (risk-averse type), b2 :
don’t use safety equipment (risk-loving type).
First scenario: The hazardous task is introduced in an existing context.
It is imposed on the workers. They are given only the choice to use or not
to use safety equipment (B). We write the initial state of the worker as
|ψ〉 = λ1 |a1 (B)〉+ λ2 |a2 (B)〉 , λ21 + λ22 = 1.
Substituting for (4) and (5) we write the state in the basis of the B operator
as
|ψ〉 = [λ1 〈b1| a1 (B)〉+ λ2 〈b1| a2 (B)〉] |b1〉+
+ [λ1 〈b2| a1 (B)〉+ λ2 〈b2| a2 (B)〉] |b2〉 .
The probability that a worker chooses to use safety equipment is
pB (b1) = 〈b1| ψ〉2 = [λ1 〈b1| a1 (B)〉+ λ2 〈b1| a2 (B)〉]2
= λ21 〈b1| a1 (B)〉2 + λ22 〈b1| a2 (B)〉2 + 2λ1λ2 〈b1| a2 (B)〉 〈b1| a1 (B)〉 .
Second scenario: First A then B. The workers choose between taking
a new job with a hazardous task or staying with the current safe routine.
Those who chose the new job then face the choice between adopting safety
measures or not. Those who turn down the new job offer are asked to answer
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a questionnaire about their choice in the hypothetical case where they are
confronted with a risky task. The ex-ante probability for observing b1 is
pBA (b1) = pA (a1 (B)) pB (b1| a1 (B)) + pA (a2 (B)) pB (b1| a2 (B))
= λ21 〈b1| a1 (B)〉2 + λ22 〈b1| a2 (B)〉2 .
The empirically documented phenomenon of ‘cognitive dissonance’ can now
be formulated as
pBA (b1) < pB (b1) ,
which occurs in our model when 2λ1λ2 〈b1| a2 (B)〉 〈b1| a1 (B)〉 > 0. Before
moving to a numerical example showing that interference effects may be
quantitatively significant, we note that pBA (b1) includes the probability of a
choice of safety measures both in the group that chose the risky job and in the
group that chose the safe job. This guarantees that we properly distinguish
between the CD effect (change in attitude) and the selection bias.
Numerical example
Assume for simplicity that |ψ〉 = |b1〉 so everybody in the first sce-
nario is willing to use the proposed safety equipment. Let prob (a1 |ψ ) =
0.25, and prob (a2 |ψ ) = .75 so 〈b1 |a1〉 = ±
√
0.25, and 〈b1 |a2〉 = ±
√
0.75.











= 0.5625 + 0.0625± 2 · 0.1875.
Since |ψ〉 = |b1〉 , we have 〈b1 |ψ〉2 = 1 which implies that the interference
effect is positive (the amplitudes 〈b1 |a1〉 and 〈b1 |a2〉 are of the same sign).
We note that it amounts to a third of the probability.
Under the second scenario the probability for taking the safety measure
is the sum of the conditional which is obtained immediately by substraction
of the interference term
pBA (b1) = pB (b1)− interference term = 1− 2 · 0.1875 = 0.625
The desired result obtains: pBA (b1) < pB (b1) .
Comments
The contribution of the indeterminacy approach is two-sided. First the
HSM provides a model that explains the appearance of ’cognitive dissonance’.
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Indeed, if coherence is such a basic need, as proposed by L. Festinger and
his followers, why does dissonance occur in the first place? In the HSM
‘dissonance’ arises when resolving indeterminacy in the first DS because of the
‘limitations’ on possible psychological types (cf Mackey (2000) and Section
2.3.2). Second, the HSM features a dynamic process such that the propensity
to use safety measures is actually altered (reduced) as a consequence of the
act of choice. This dynamic effect of coherence (which arises when choosing
in the second DS) is reminiscent of the psychologists’ “drive-like property of
dissonance” leading to a change in attitude. Coherence is expressed by the
structure of the state space itself, i.e., by the correlation matrices that reflect
psychological regularities.
3.2 Framing Effects
Providing a framework for thinking about framing effects is one of the impor-
tant and promising applications of the indeterminacy approach in decision
theory. Kahneman and Tversky (2002, p. xiv) define the framing effect using
a two-steps (nonformal) model of the decision-making process. The first step
corresponds to the construction of a representation of the decision situation.
The second step corresponds to the evaluation of the choice alternatives.
The crucial point is that “the true objects of evaluation are neither objects
in the real world nor verbal description of those objects; they are mental rep-
resentations.” To capture this feature we suggest modelling of the process of
constructing a representation in a way similar to the process of constructing
preferences. This is consistent with the approach in psychology that treats
attitudes, values (preferences), beliefs, and representations as mental objects
of the same kind. We thus propose that the process of decision-making be
modelled as a sequence of two observables (operators). A framing or FR is
defined as a collection of alternative mental representations (of a decision sit-
uation). The corresponding observable is denoted A˜, where the tilde is used
to distinguish between operators associated with FRs and those associated
with DSs. We model the process of constructing (selecting) a representation
as the analogue of the ‘measurement’ of the operator corresponding to the
framing proposed to the agent, i.e., the collapse onto one of the framing op-
erators’ eigenvectors (onto one of the alternative mental representations).17
17Interestingly, this approach is consistent with research in neurobiology that suggests
that the perception of a situation involves operations in the brain very similar to those
19
In contrast with the types associated with a DS, the types associated with
a FR (hereafter we call them FR-type) are not directly observable but they
could, in principle, be elicited by a questionnaire.
The operators associated with FRs and DSs are defined within the same
state space of representations/preferences. One interpretation is that rep-
resentations and preferences have grown entangled through the activity of
the mind i.e. in decision processes.18 We now provide an illustration of this
approach.
In Selten (1998) an experiment performed by Pruitt (1970) is discussed.
Two groups of agents are invited to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma. The game
in the usual matrix form is presented to the first group but with the choices
labelled 1 and 2 (instead of C and D, presumably to avoid associations with












The game is presented to the second group with payoffs decomposed as
follows:
For me For him
1G 0 3
2G 1 0
The payoffs are the sums of what you take for yourself and what you
get from the other player. Game theoretically it should make no difference
whether the game is presented in matrix form or in decomposed form. How-
ever, an experiment by Pruitt shows that one observes dramatically more
cooperation in the game when presented in decomposed form.
involved when chosing an action. ‘To perceive is not only to combine, weigh, it is to select’.
( Berthoz, 2003, p.10)
18In quantum physics the entanglement of the states of two spin-1/2 particles in the
singlet spin state means that the two particles form a single system that cannot be factored
out into two subsystems even when separated by a great distance (cf. the famous Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) non-locality paradox).
20
Selten proposes a ‘bounded rationality’ explanation: players make a su-
perficial analysis and do not perceive the identity of the game presented
under the two forms. We propose that the agents after having been con-
fronted with the matrix presentation are not in the same state as before and
not in the same state as the agents that have been confronted with the de-
composed form. The object of evaluation does not pre-exist the interaction
between the agent and the framed decision situation. It is, as Kahneman
and Tversky (2000) propose, constructed in the process of decision-making.
Using the framework developed in this paper, we call A˜ the FR oper-
ator corresponding to the framing of the matrix presentation, B˜ the one
corresponding to the framing of the decomposed presentation, and G the
DS operator associated with the game. G has two non-degenerated eigen-
values denoted 1G and 2G. The first step in the decision process corresponds
to the selection of a mental representation of the decision situation. At
this stage, the agent is subjected to a frame A˜ or B˜. Accordingly, be-
fore being presented with the DS in some form, the agent is described by
a superposition of possible mental representations. For simplicity we assume
that each frame only consists of two alternative representations. We can
write |ψ〉 = α1 |a˜1〉 + α2 |a˜2〉 and |ψ〉 = β1
∣∣∣˜b1〉 + β2 ∣∣∣˜b2〉 . We propose the
following description of the mental representations (this is meant only as a
suggestive illustration)
|a˜1〉 : G is perceived as an (artificial) small-stake game;
|a˜2〉 : G is perceived by analogy as a real life PD-like situation (often
occurring in a repeated setting).∣∣∣˜b1〉 : G is perceived as a test of generosity;∣∣∣˜b2〉 : G is perceived as a test of smartness.
Given any initial state, subjecting the agent to either frame leads to a
collapse onto either one of the two mental representations associated with
that frame. The state of the agent becomes some |a˜i〉 or
∣∣∣˜bj〉 (i, j = 1, 2). In
the basis of the decision situation {|1G〉 , |2G〉}, the state of our agent is
|a˜i〉 = γ1i |1G〉+ γ2i |2G〉 ;∣∣∣˜bj〉 = δ1j |1G〉+ δ2j |2G〉 .
We can now express the framing effect by the following difference:
p
GA˜
(iG) 6= pGB˜ (iG) , i = 1, 2. (6)
Using our result in Section 2.3.2 we get
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pGA˜ (1G) = pG (1G)− 2α1γ11α2γ12
p
GB˜
(1G) = pG (1G)− 2β1δ11β2δ12,
where pG (1G) is the probability of choosing 1 in an (hypothetical) unframed
situation. So we have a framing effect whenever 2α1γ11α2γ12 6= 2β1δ11β2δ12. The
experimental results discussed in Selten (1998) obtain with 2β1δ11β2δ12 <
2α1γ11α2γ12. In general, unless the FR-types belonging to A˜ are perfectly
correlated with those belonging to B˜ or the FR operators both commute
with the decision operator, we have pGA˜ (1A) 6= pGB˜ (1A) .
Comments
Kahneman and Tversky suggest that prior to the choice, a representation
of the decision situation must be constructed. The HSM provides a frame-
work for ‘constructing’ a representation such that it captures framing effects
in choice behavior. A representation is a mental image of reality. A (classical)
consistency requirement is that representations be ‘compatible’, i.e., it must
be possible to derive the different representations from a single underlying
reality.19 In terms of the theory developed in this paper this is equivalent to
requiring that all FR operators are commuting. In contrast, the HSM allows
for ‘incompatible’ representations i.e., that cannot be consolidated into one
single consistent picture of the decision situation although they do repre-
sent the same reality.20 This is because we do not assume that the picture
pre-exists the ‘act of representation.’ The quantum model of reality allows
us to understand framing effects without assuming that the individual is
‘boundedly rational’, which is consistent with highly rational agents exhibit-
ing framing effects. In the HSM framework, framing effects arise ‘naturally’
as a consequence of (initial) indeterminacy of the agent’s representation of
the decision situation. So far this is only a descriptive analysis. In order for
it to gain some predictive power we must identify those properties of frame
operators that are common to a class of DSs. One example of such a prop-
erty is that the choice situation is mentally represented as a test of personal
19This is reminiscient of the consistency requirement when modelling subjective beliefs.
20The representations are ‘revealed’ incompatible in the sense that agents make differ-
ent choices in game-theoretically equivalent situations. In our framework incompatibility
of representations is expressed as the non-commutativity of the corresponding framing
operator (representations are eigenvalues belonging to a framing operator).
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qualities (cf. B˜ above). Another approach is to focus on the mental repre-
sentation stage. We could experimentally investigate the effect of a sequence
of frame operators in different orders on choice.
3.2.1 Testing the theory
In this section we propose two experimental tests of the proposed theory.
Experiment 1: Superposition of states of mind Consider two iden-
tical populations of agents I and II. We propose an experiment where the
two populations are invited to play a Prisoners’ Dilemma game against a
hidden player. Before playing the PD game,the agents from the first pop-
ulation are invited to answer a question by YES or NO.21 For the sake of
the argument it does not matter what the question is, provided it bears on a
relevant type characteristic. It could, for instance, be a question interpreted
as revealing whether the agent is ‘selfish’ or ‘altruistic’. The agents from the
second population play the PD game without any ‘preparation’.
Suppose that we observe a proportion α of YES-answers in the first pop-
ulation of agents (and a proportion (1− α) of NO-answers). Denote by B
the operator representing the question. Now, the agents are invited to play
the PD game (operator A).
Assume that we find that a proportion β of agents of the ‘YES-type’
(agents who have answered YES) choose to cooperate ((1− β) choose to
defect) and a proportion γ of agents of the ’NO-type’ choose to cooperate
((1− γ) to defect). The proportion of agents of the first population choosing
C is thus
pI(C) = αβ + (1− α)γ.
The second part of the experiment is performed on the other population
of agents who play the PD game directly. From a classical point of view,
agents are either YES-type or NO-type independently of the fact that they
have answered the questionnaire (cf. stable innate preferences). Since the
two populations are identical, we should be able to apply the conditional
probability formula to obtain
pII(C) = p(a)p(C|a) + p(s)p(C|s) = αβ + (1− α)γ.
21Such YES/NO questions are the basis of Mackey’s Quantum Logic. Any observable
can be expressed as the meet of reciprocally orthogonal YES/NO questions.
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Assume that we find that the proportion of agents in population II who
choose C is p′(C), which is significantly different from pII(C) above. The only
way to explain these results within a classical framework would be to give
up the conditional probability formula and hence to assume that the agents,
though remaining in a definite state (YES-type or NO-type) nevertheless
change the way they play the PD game solely by the virtue of having answered
the question. This assumption does not seem to be consistent with the idea
of an agent having stable innate preferences.
We propose that at the beginning, the agent is in a superposition of
two types: YES-type and NO-type. Both modes of behavior are ‘latent’ and
have the potential to be observed. As the agent answers the question, this
‘hesitation’ is resolved: one of the two behavioral inclinations (propensities
to act) emerges as his type. Before this operation, the two modes of behavior
affect his choice (in the PD game) but as soon as one mode has manifested
itself, only this mode is active. If in fact the results with respect to the
choice in the PD game turn out to be different in the two situations (having
answered the question or not), the proposed experiment provides support
for the hypothesis that preferences are indeterminate, i.e., agents can be
represented by a superposition of types.
Experiment 2: Order matters We consider three different DSs: the
first is the familiar Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD); the second is the Dictator
Game (DG) with the two options ‘sharing equally’ and ‘sharing selfishly’.22
The third DS that we consider is the responder’s decision situation in the
Ultimatum Game (UG).23 Suppose that we have empirically established that
order matters for the two pairs of DSs (PD, DG) and (DG,UG). According
to our theory, these DSs must be represented by pairs of non-commuting
operators. Then, unless the behavior types in the PD and UG are perfectly
correlated, (i.e., the players who choose ‘cooperate’ in the PD either always
select the action ‘accept’ in UG or they always select ‘refuse’), our theory
22The Dictator Game is a two-players game in which one player, the Dictator, decides
on a split of an amount of money, say 100 units, between himself and the other player who
is actually a dummy.
23The Ultimatum Game is played as follows. The first mover (here a hidden player)
proposes a given split of a known sum of money. The decision of the responder is whether
to accept or to reject the split. In the case of rejection, the payoff is zero to both players,
in particular to our decision-maker – the responder.
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predicts that order matters in the play of the pair of DSs (PD,UG).24
In order to test this prediction we propose the following experiment. We
first establish whether or not order matters between the first two pairs of
DSs (PD,DG) and (DG,UG) using the following procedure: we take two
populations of identical individuals (assumed to be represented by the same
state vector). The first population is invited to play the following sequence:
first the PD (against a hidden player as in experiment 1) and thereafter
the DG (against a hidden third player). The individuals from the second
population are invited to play the same DSs but in the reverse order: first
the DG and thereafter the PD. If the distributions of choices turn out to be
significantly different we have established that order matters when playing
the PD and DG. We perform a similar test for (DG,UG) (with another set of
participants). If we do observe that order matters even in this case, we move
on to the next step.
The next step of the experiment is to test whether the types in PD and UG
are perfectly correlated, and we do this by selecting a population of agents
who have chosen ‘cooperate’ in the PD. Assuming that there is no evidence
of perfect correlation, we can then move to the last phase of the experiment,
namely, testing the prediction that PD and UG are non-commuting decision
situations. We do that by the same procedure we used to test the non-
commutativity of (PD,DG) and (DG,UG) (of course with another set of
participants). If we do in fact observe that the distributions of choices are
significantly different it will be consistent with our theory indeterminacy of
preferences.
Our objective is to take two examples of experiments that involve a com-
mon decision situation and for which two different behavioral theories have
been proposed. Our contribution would be to link the two experimental
phenomena with a ‘cross-prediction’ along the lines described above. If the
prediction turns out to be correct but cannot be explained by either one of
those theories, we will have demonstrated that our theory has the potential
to both unify some of the existing body of behavioral economics and generate
new results.
24Technically speaking, given three operators A,B,C (with two eigenvectors each), if
both (A,B) and (B,C) are pairs of non-commuting operators, then the eigenvectors of A
as well as those of C form a basis of the same two-dimensional space. If, in addition, A
and C commute, then A and C must have the same eigenvectors. The two operators differ
only in terms of the names given to the eigenvalues. In other words the types in A are
perfectly correlated with the types in C.
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we propose an approach to decision-making that has the po-
tential to provide a unified framework for explaining a variety of so-called
‘behavioral anomalies’. The basic idea is that preferences, besides being typ-
ically unknown (to other agents), are also indeterminate. A main implication
of the indeterminacy of preferences is that a choice situation does not merely
reveal the (fixed) preferences of an agent, but also contributes to constructing
them. Consequently, in order to be able to make predictions one also must
account for the context in which preferences are expressed. The Hilbert space
model we propose provides a mathematical model for making such contextual
predictions.
We argue that this abstract model may be an appropriate extension of
Harsanyi’s model of uncertainty, which accommodates empirically observed
phenomena, like cognitive dissonance, context dependency of preferences or
framing effects.
This preliminary investigation is a first step of a larger research program
intended to investigate the implications of the indeterminacy hypothesis in
game theory and economics. Those implications will then be tested experi-
mentally.
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5 Appendix: Elements of Quantum Mechan-
ics
5.1 States and Observables
In Quantum Mechanics the state of a system is represented by a vector |ψ〉 in
a Hilbert space H. According to the superposition principle, every complex
linear combination of state vectors is a state vector. A Hermitian operator
called an observable is associated to each physical property of the system.
Theorem 1
A Hermitian operator A has the following properties:
- Its eigenvalues are real.
- Two eigenvectors corresponding to different eigenvalues are orthogonal.
- There is an orthonormal basis of the relevant Hilbert space formed with
the eigenvectors of A.
Let us call |v1〉 , |v2〉 , ..., |vn〉 the normalized eigenvectors of A forming a
basis of H. They are associated with eigenvalues α1,α2, ..., αn, so: A |vi〉 =
αi |vi〉. The eigenvalues can possibly be degenerated, i.e., for some i and j,
αi = αj. This means that there is more than one linearly independent eigen-
vector associated with the same eigenvalue. The number of these eigenvectors
defines the degree of degeneracy of the eigenvalue which in turn defines the
dimension of the eigensubspace spanned by these eigenvectors. In this case,
the orthonormal basis of H is not unique because it is possible to replace the
eigenvectors associated to the same eigenvalue by any complex linear combi-
nation of them to get another orthonormal basis. When an observable A has
no degenerated eigenvalue there is a unique orthonormal basis of H formed
with its eigenvectors. In this case (see below), it is by itself a Complete Set
of Commuting Observables.
Theorem 2
If two observables A and B commute there is an orthonormal basis of H
formed by eigenvectors common to A and B.
Let A be an observable with at least one degenerated eigenvalue and B
another observable commuting with A. There is no unique orthonormal basis
formed by A eigenvectors. But there is an orthonormal basis of the relevant
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Hilbert space formed by eigenvectors common to A and B. By definition,
{A,B} is a Complete Set of Commuting Observables (CSCO) if this basis
is unique. Generally, a set of observables {A,B, ...} is said to be a CSCO if
there is a unique orthonormal basis formed by eigenvectors common to all
the observables of the set.
5.2 The measurement
An observable A is associated to each physical property of a system S. Let
|v1〉 , |v2〉 , ..., |vn〉 be the normalized eigenvectors of A associated respectively
with eigenvalues α1,α2, ..., αn and forming a basis of the relevant state space.
Assume the system is in the normalized state |ψ〉. A measurement of A
on S obeys the following rules, collectively called ‘Wave Packet Reduction
Principle’ (the Reduction Principle).
Reduction Principle
1. When a measurement of the physical property associated with an
observable A is made on a system S in a state |ψ〉, the result only can be
one of the eigenvalues of A.
2. The probability to get the non-degenerated value αi is P (αi) =
|〈vi|ψ〉|2 .
3. If the eigenvalue is degenerated then the probability is the sum over
the eigenvectors associated with this eigenvalue: P (αi) =
∑∣∣〈νji |ψ〉∣∣2 .
4. If the measurement of A on a system S in the state |ψ〉 has given the
result αi then the state of the system immediately after the measurement
is the normalized projection of |ψ〉 onto the eigensubspace of the relevant
Hilbert space associated with αi. If the eigenvalue is not degenerated then
the state of the system after the measurement is the normalized eigenvector
associated with the eigenvalue.
If two observables A and B commute then it is possible to measure both
simultaneously: the measurement of A is not altered by the measurement
of B. This means that measuring B after measuring A does not change the
value obtained for A. If we again measure A after a measurement of B, we
again get the same value for A. Both observables can have a definite value.
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5.2.1 Interferences
The archetypal example of interferences in quantum mechanics is given by
the famous two-slits experiment.25 A parallel beam of photons falls on a
diaphragm with two parallel slits and strikes a photographic plate. A typical
interference pattern showing alternate bright and dark rays can be seen. If
one slit is shut then the previous figure becomes a bright line in front of the
open slit. This is perfectly understandable if we consider photons as waves,
as it the assumption is in classical electromagnetism. The explanation is
based on the fact that when both slits are open, one part of the beam goes
through one slit and the other part through the other slit. Then, when the
two beams join on the plate, they interfere constructively (giving bright rays)
or destructively (giving dark ones), depending on the difference in length of
the paths they have followed. But a difficulty arises if photons are considered
as particles, as can be the case in quantum mechanics. Indeed, it is possible to
decrease the intensity of the beam so as to have only one photon travelling
at a time. In this case, if we observe the slits in order to detect when a
photon passes through (for example, by installing a photodetector in front of
the slits), it is possible to see that each photon goes through only one slit. It
is never the case that a photon splits to go through both slits. The photons
behave like particles. Actually, the same experiment was done with electrons
instead of photons, with the same result. If we do the experiment this way
with electrons (observing which slit the electrons go through, i.e., sending
light through each slit to “see” the electrons), we see that each electron goes
through just one slit and, in this case, we get no interference. If we repeat the
same experiment without observing which slit the electrons pass through then
we recover the interference pattern. Thus, the simple fact that we observe
which slit the electron goes through destroys the interference pattern (two
single slit patterns are observed). The quantum explanation is based on
the assumption that when we don’t observe through which slit the electron
has gone then its state is a superposition of both states “gone through slit 1”
and “gone through slit 2”26, while when we observe it, its state collapses onto
one of these states. In the first case, the position measurement is made on
electrons in the superposed state and gives an interference pattern since both
states are manifested in the measurement. In the second case, the position is
25See, e.g., Feynman (1965) for a very clear presentation.
26This doesn’t mean that the photon actually went through both slits. This state simply
can’t be interpretated from a classical point of view.
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measured on electrons in a definite state and no interference arises. In other
words, when only slit 1 is open we get a spectrum, say S1 (and S2 when only
slit 2 is open). We expect to get a spectrum S12 that sums of the two previous
spectra when both slits are open, but this is not the case: S12 6= S1 + S2.
5.3 HSM and the classic probabilistic model
This Appendix is intended to clarify the relationship between the proposed
Hilbert space representation and the classical, probabilistic representation.
Our typical setup is that of two observables, Awith eigenvalues {1A, 2A, ..., nA},
and B with eigenvalues {1B, 2B, ..., mB} . So to treat both observables we ex-
press the Hilbert space H as a direct sum in two different ways:
H = H1A⊕, ....,⊕HnA and H = H1B⊕, ....,⊕HmB ,
where HiA is the subspace of eigenvectors of A with eigenvalue iA (similarly
















ν2j = 1 |jBψ〉 ∈ HjB , j = 1, ..., m. (8)








µ2ij = 1 |iAjB〉 ∈ HiA , i = 1, ..., n. (9)
Note that since the vectors |iAψ〉 and |iAjB〉, are both in HiA, they are eigen-
vectors of A with the same eigenvalue iA. The non-commutativity of A and
B is the violation of the equation
pA (iA) = pAB (iA) , i = 1, ...n, (10)






j . That is, the probability distribution on the outcomes
of the measurement A may be affected by the fact that we measured B before
A.
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Can this be modelled in standard probability theory? The answer is obvi-
ously yes. To do that letA be a random variable with values in {1A, 2A, ..., nA, }
and with probabilities pA (iA) = αi ≡ λ2i , i = 1, ..., n, which will be the
equivalent of eq. (7). Similarly, the equivalent of eq. (8) is obtained if B
is a random variable with values in {1B, 2B, ..., mB} and with probabilities
pB (jB) = βj ≡ ν2j , j = 1, ..., m.
What is the analogue of eq. (9)? For each value jB of B there is a
probability distribution pAjB of the random variable A given by
pAjB (iA) = γij ≡ µ2ij ; i = 1, ...n, j = 1, ..., m. (11)





βjγij i = 1, ..., n.






analogue of eq. (10) is
α = βγ, (12)
which is generally not satisfied unless we impose restrictions on α, β, and γ.27
The following facts are easily verified:
• The equality (12) holds if and only if there is a probability distribution
p on {(iA, jB) ; i = 1, ..., n, j = 1, ..., m} whose marginal distribution
of A and B are pA and pB respectively.
In such a case pAjB is just the conditional probability
pAjB (iA) = p (iA |jB ) (13)
and eq. (12) is then just the fundamental equation of conditional proba-





• In the HSM framework eq. (10) holds if and only if the observables A
and B commute, and we conclude that



























1. Two commuting decision situations A and B can be modelled by
one standard probability space whose elementary events are the
pairs (iA, jB) of values of the two observables.
2. Two non-commuting DSs A and B cannot be modelled by a sin-
gle probability space. In particular, pAjB (iA) is not a conditional
probability in the formal sense since there is no underlying proba-
bility space in which the probabilities p (iA, jB) are defined.
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